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Abstract 
Most reinforcement learning methods oper­
ate on propositional representations of the 
world state. Such representations are of­
ten intractably large and generalize poorly. 
Using a deictic representation is believed to 
be a viable alternative: they promise gener­
alization while allowing the use of existing 
reinforcement-learning methods. Yet, there 
are few experiments on learning with deic­
tic representations reported in the literature. 
In this paper we explore the effectiveness 
of two forms of deictic representation and a 
naive propositional representation in a sim­
ple blocks-world domain. We find, empiri­
cally, that the deictic representations actu­
ally worsen learning performance. We con­
clude with a discussion of possible causes of 
these results and strategies for more effective 
learning in domains with objects. 
1 Introduction 
Real-world domains involve objects: things like chairs, 
tables, cups, and people. Yet most current machine 
learning algorithms require the world to be represented 
as a vector of attributes. How should we apply our 
learning algorithms in domains with objects? It is 
likely that we will have to develop learning algorithms 
that use truly relational representations, as has been 
done generally in inductive logic programming [12], 
and specifically by Dzeroski et a!. [5] for relational 
reinforcement learning. However, before moving to 
more complex mechanisms, it is important to estab­
lish whether, and if so, how and why, existing tech­
niques break down in such domains. In this paper, we 
document our attempts to apply relatively standard 
reinforcement-learning techniques to an apparently re­
lational domain. 
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One strategy that has been successful in the plan­
ning world [8] is to propositionalize what is essentially 
a relational domain. That is, to make an attribute 
vector with a single Boolean attribute for each possi­
ble instance of the properties and relations in the do­
main. There are some fairly serious potential problems 
with such a representation, including the fact that it 
does not give much basis for generalization over ob­
jects. Additionally, the number of bits to be consid­
ered grows exponentially with the number of objects 
in the world, even if the task to be accomplished does 
not become more complicated. An alternative to this 
full-propositional representation is to create a deictic­
propositional representation that, intuitively, affords 
more possibility for appropriate generalization. 
The word deictic was introduced into the artificial in­
telligence vernacular by Agre and Chapman [1], who 
were building on Ullman's work on visual routines [15]. 
A deictic expression is one that "points" to something: 
its meaning is relative to the agent that uses it and 
the context in which it is used. The-book-that-J-am­
holding and the-door-that-is-in-front-of-me are exam­
ples of deictic expressions in natural language. The 
primary motivation for the use of deictic representa­
tion is that it avoids the arbitrary naming of objects, 
naturally grounding them in agent-centric terms [2]. 
Deictic representations have the potential to bridge 
the gap between relational and propositional represen­
tations, allowing much of the generalization afforded 
by first-order representations yet remaining amenable 
to solution (even in the face of uncertainty) by existing 
algorithms. 
Our motivating intuition was that deictic represen­
tations might ameliorate the severe scaling problems 
of full-propositional representations. First, we can 
achieve passive generalization through use of the mark­
ers. For example, if I have learned what to do with 
the-cup-that-J-am-holding, it doesn't matter whether 
that cup is cup3 or cup7. Second, since the size of 
the observation space in a deictic representation only 
UAI2002 FINNEY ET AL. 155 
grows with the number of attentional markers, our 
agent should be able to perform a task in domains 
with varying numbers of objects more easily than the 
full-propositional agent. Last, we expected that our 
deictic agent would gain an advantage from the ability 
to focus its attention on aspects of the world relevant 
to its current activity and to ignore the aspects that 
do not matter. 
In most deictic representations, and especially those 
in which the agent has significant control over what it 
perceives, there is a substantial degree of partial ob­
servability: in exchange for focusing on a few things, 
we lose the ability to see the rest. As McCallum ob­
served in his thesis [10], partial observability is a two­
edged sword: it may help learning by obscuring ir­
relevant distinctions as well as hinder it by obscuring 
relevant ones. 
What is missing in the literature is a systematic evalu­
ation of the impact of switching from full-propositional 
to deictic representations with respect to learning per­
formance. The next sections report on a set of exper­
iments that begin such an exploration. 
2 Experiment Domain 
Our learning agent exists in a simulated blocks world. 
It must learn to pick up a green block by first removing 
any blocks covering it. This problem domain was in­
troduced by Whitehead and Ballard [16] in their early 
work on deixis in relational domains. They developed 
the Lion algorithm to deal with the domain's partial 
observability by avoiding aliased states. McCallum [9] 
showed that this partial observability could be directly 
handled by keeping a short history of observations. 
For example, if the agent is currently looking at, say, 
a red block in the domain shown in Figure 1, it cannot 
tell if it should proceed to search for the green block, 
or if it should pick up that red block in order to clear it 
from off the top of the green block. By examining the 
last action and observation, however, the agent knows 
that if it has just looked up from a green block, then it 
is in the state where it should clear off the red block. 
The experiments described in this section differ from 
previous empirical work with deictic representations in 
two important ways. First, our goal was to compare 
the utility of the different representations, rather than 
to evaluate or develop a learning algorithm tailored 
for one representation. Second, we have not tuned the 
perceptual features, actions, or training paradigm to 
the task but instead developed a set of perceptual fea­
tures and actions that seemed reasonable for an agent 
that might be given an arbitrary task in a blocks world. 
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Figure 1: Adding history to handle partial observability. 
2.1 Two Deictic Representations 
A deictic name for an object can be conceived as a 
long string like the-block-that-I'm-holding, an idea that 
can be implemented with a set of markers. For ex­
ample, if the agent is focusing on a particular block, 
that block becomes the-block-that-I'm-looking-at; if the 
agent then fixes a marker onto that block and moves 
its attention somewhere else, the block becomes the­
block-that-1-was-looki n g-at. 
For our experiments, we developed two flavors of de­
ictic representation. In the first case, called "focused" 
deixis, there is a focus marker and one additional 
marker. The agent receives all perceptual information 
relating to the focused block: its color (red, blue, 
green, or table), and whether the block is in the 
agent's hand. In addition, the agent can identify a 
marker bound to any block that is above, below, left 
of, or right of the focus. The second case, called "wide" 
deixis, receives perceptual information (color and iden­
tities of any adjacent markers) for each marked block, 
not just the focused block. The action set for both 
deictic agents is: 
• move-focus{ direction): The focus cannot be 
moved beyond the top of the stack or below the 
table. If the focus is to be moved to the side and 
there is no block at that height, the focus falls to 
the top of the stack on that side. 
• focus-on( color): If there is more than one block of 
the specified color, the focus will land randomly 
on one of them. 
• pick-up(): This action succeeds if the focused 
block is a non-table block at the top of a stack. 
• put-down(): Put down the block at the top of the 
stack being focused. 
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• marker-to-focus(marker ): Move the specified 
marker to coincide with the focus. 
• focus-to-marker( marker): Move the focus to co­
incide with the specified marker. 
2.2 Full-Propositional Representation 
In the fully observable propositional case, arbitrary 
names are assigned to each block. The agent can per­
ceive a block's color, the location of the block, and the 
name of any block under it. In addition, there is a 
single bit that indicates whether the hand is holding a 
block. The propositional agent's action set is: 
• pick-up(block# ): This action succeeds only if the 
block is a non-table block at the top of a stack. 
• put-down(): Put down the block at the top of the 
stack under the hand. 
• move-hand(left/right): This action fails if the 
agent attempts to move the hand beyond the edge 
of the table. 
2.3 Comparing State and Action Spaces 
Propositional representations yield large observation 
spaces and full observability; deictic representations 
yield small observation spaces and partial observabil­
ity. We examine the concrete implications of this next. 
Our experiments used two different blocks-world start­
ing configurations (Figure 2). The number of distinct1 
block arrangements is 12 in the blocksl setup and 60 
in blocks2. The underlying state space in the full­
propositional case depends on all the ways to name 
the blocks. This yields 5760 ground states in blocksl 
and 172,800 in blocks2. The size of the observation 
space, however, outpaces the number of ground states 
dramatically: roughly 10 billion in blocksl and roughly 
3 trillion in blocks2. 2 
The underlying state space in the deictic case depends 
on possible marker locations rather than on block 
names. This gives a total of 1200 ground states in 
blocksl and 8640 in blocks2. The size of the observa­
tion space, however, is constant in both domains: the 
size of the focused deictic observation space is 512, and 
that of the wide deictic observation space is 4096 [ 6]. 
The action set for the deictic representations does not 
change with additional blocks, so it is constant at 12 
actions. The full-propositional representation requires 
an additional pickup() action for each block, so it has 
five possible actions in blocksl and six in blocks2. 
1 Blocks of the same color are interchangeable. 
2Note that this observation space corresponds to the 
size needed for a look-up table, and it includes many com­
binations of percepts that are not actually possible. 
Figure 2: The two blocks-world configurations: a) blocks I 
and b) blocks2. The table is made of unmovable table­
colored blocks. 
3 Learning Algorithms 
In these experiments, we took the approach of using 
model-free, value-based reinforcement learning algo­
rithms, because it was our goal to understand their 
strengths and weaknesses in this domain. In the con­
clusions, we discuss alternative methods. 
As discussed previously, because we no longer observe 
the whole state in the deictic representation, we have 
to include some history. The additional information 
requirement renders the observation space too large for 
an explicit representation of the value function, like a 
look-up table. Thus, we required learning algorithms 
that can approximate the value function. 
We chose Q-learning with a neural-network func­
tion approximator (known as neuro-dynamic program­
ming [3], or NDP) as a baseline, since it is a common 
and successful method for reinforcement learning in 
large domains with feature-based representation. We 
hoped to improve on the performance of NDP by us­
ing function approximators that could use history se­
lectively, such as the G algorithm [4] and McCallum's 
U-Tree algorithm [10]. After some initial experiments 
with U-Tree, we settled on using a tree-growing algo­
rithm based on the G algorithm and U-Tree. 
3.1 Neuro-Dynamic Programming 
Our implementation of NDP used a two-layer back­
propagation neural network for each action. The input 
to each network was a vector containing the current 
observation plus some number of previous observations 
and actions. The input layer to each network consists 
of one node per possible action and observation feature 
value; a given input vector is encoded by setting the 
appropriate input nodes to one and the rest to zero. 
The output of each network is the estimated Q-value 
for that action in the state represented by the input 
vector. As has been observed by others [14], we found 
that SARSA led to more stable results than Q-learning 
because of the partial observability of the domain. 
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3.2 Tree-Growing Algorithm 
The G algorithm uses a tree structure to determine 
which elements of the state space are important for 
predicting reward. A leaf in the tree is the agent's 
internal representation for a state, and it corresponds 
to a series of perceptual distinctions useful for predict­
ing reward. Each leaf determines the agent's policy by 
estimating Q-values for the possible outgoing actions. 
The tree is initialized with a root node that makes no 
state distinctions. The root has a fringe of nodes be­
neath it, where each fringe node represents a possible 
further distinction. Statistics are kept in the root node 
and the fringe nodes about reward received during the 
agent's lifetime. A statistical test determines whether 
any of the distinctions in the fringe are worth adding 
permanently to the tree; that is, it looks for statistical 
differences between the reward values of a parent node 
and its fringe nodes. If a further distinction is found to 
be statistically significant, the fringe nodes under that 
parent become official leaves, and a new fringe set is 
created beneath each new leaf node. 
At this level of description, the G algorithm is essen­
tially the same as U-Tree. The major distinction be­
tween them is that U-Tree requires much less expe­
rience with the world at the price of greater compu­
tational complexity: it remembers historical data and 
uses it to estimate a model of the environment's tran­
sition dynamics, and then uses the model to choose a 
state to split. The G algorithm makes each new split­
ting choice based on direct estimates of the Q values 
from new data. U-Tree uses a non-parametric statis­
tical test (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) for splitting 
nodes, which is more robust than the test used by the 
original G. The G-based algorithm used in this work 
extends G by using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and 
by considering distinctions over a finite history win­
dow (rather than just the current observation). See 
the technical report [6] for a discussion of the differ­
ences between G and U-Tree, and the way in which 
the G algorithm of this paper differs from the original. 
4 Experiment Outcomes 
We conducted a set of learning experiments in the 
blocks-world environments shown in Figure 2. The 
task in both cases was to pick up the green block. The 
agent received a reward whenever it succeeded at the 
task, a penalty if it took an action that failed (e.g., at­
tempted to move its hand off the edge of the world, or 
attempted to pick up the table), and a smaller penalty 
for each step otherwise. The agent used an <-greedy 
exploration strategy, with E = 0.10. 
The left plot in Figure 3 shows the results from running 
the NDP algorithm in the blocksl domain. The graph 
shows the scaled total reward3 received in a testing 
trial plotted against the number of training steps: at 
the end of each set of 200 training steps, the state 
of the learning algorithm was frozen and the agent 
took a 100-step testing trial during which the total 
accumulated reward was measured; exploration was 
not turned off during testing. Each curve for blocksl 
is averaged over 10 experiments, and for blocks2 over 
five experiments. 
From the graph, we see that the deictic representations 
did not immediately show the edge we anticipated. We 
expected, then, to see them gain an advantage with the 
addition of a distractor block, as in blocks2. The re­
sults are shown on the right side of Figure 3. Rather 
than surpassing, or even approaching, the performance 
of the full-propositional agent, the deictic agents per­
formed worse than before. 
Clearly, by adding additional blocks yet retaining the 
same observation space, we were aggravating the par­
tial observability for the deictic agents. Since selec­
tively using history is a way to manage partial observ­
ability, we tried it. Figure 4 shows the results of using 
G in the two domains. While the deictic agents cer­
tainly learn faster than any of the agents learned using 
NDP, the deictic agents with G never learn the task as 
well as the full-propositional agent does with NDP. 
Furthermore, the full-propositional agent was never 
able to get off the ground with G. 
5 Discussion 
Because the goal of our work was to understand the 
characteristics of these learning approaches, rather 
than to build a particular working demonstration, we 
continued with a program of experimentation aimed 
at elucidating our counter-intuitive results. 
5.1 On Deictic and Full-Propositional 
Representations in NDP 
The optimal policy for the deictic agent is to start with 
a focus-on(green) action, then to move the focus up 
(until the top of the stack is reached), then to pick up 
the top block and move it to the side. This sequence 
should repeat until the green block is uncovered and 
picked up. In both blocks-world setups, this requires a 
sequence of nine actions. In the full-propositional case, 
the optimal policy is tedious but generates shorter ac­
tion sequences. It goes roughly as follows: if block-1 is 
green and clear, then the pick up block-1; otherwise, if 
3For each of the three representations, the reward to­
tal was scaled by the maximum reward achievable by the 
optimal policy. 
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Figure 3: Learning curves for NDP in a) the blockst domain and b) the blocks2 domain. 
block-2 is green and clear, then pick up block-2; etc. If 
there is no block that is green and clear, then if block-1 
is on top of a green block and is clear, pick up block-1; 
etc. In both blocks-world setups, the optimal policy 
requires a sequence of four actions. While the required 
action sequence is short, the same ideas have to repre­
sented over and over for each assignment of names to 
blocks. 
We initially reasoned that the deictic agent had more 
trouble learning an optimal policy because it appeared 
to have a harder exploration problem. The depen­
dence of the pick-up(), marker-to-focus(marker), and 
focus-to-marker(marker) actions on the focus location 
means that it is very easy for the agent to lose its 
place by executing an exploratory action that moves 
the focus. The result is that the outcome of the above 
actions can be wildly different depending on where the 
focus happened to land. This "distractability" reduces 
the effectiveness of using exploration to make learning 
progress. 
In analyzing the causes of the exploration problem, 
we did experiments that ruled out the longer optimal 
action sequence and the number of actions in the ac­
tion set [6]. Our final step was to created a modified 
action set. In this new action set, the pick-up() ac­
tion automatically picks up the block at the top of 
the stack pointed to by the focus, and the marker­
to-focus {marker) and focus-to-marker{ marker) actions 
were removed.4 Otherwise, the action set was the same 
as the original action set. The implication of changing 
the pick-up() action in this way is that the action is 
41nterestingly, this modified action set is similar to the 
set used by McCallum in his blocks-world experiments (9]. 
now more likely to result in a successful pickup, since 
the agent cannot even try to pick up blocks that are 
not clear (i.e., the blocks in the middle of a tall stack). 
In other words, the outcome of the all-important pick­
up() action loses its absolute dependence on the focus 
location, resulting in more robustness in the face of a 
moved focus. As we shall see, the modified action set 
rendered exploration much more effective in pointing 
the agent towards the goal. 
To compare the effects on exploration of the original 
and modified action sets, we measured, for each repre­
sentation, the number of steps required by a random 
agent to stumble upon a solution. This metric, the 
mean time-to-goal, is plotted as a function of the num­
ber of distractor blocks in Figure 5. It is clear from 
the figure that the modified deictic action set makes 
it much easier to achieve the goal via a random walk; 
with the modified actions, exploration in the deictic 
system scales in the same way as in the propositional 
system. Follow-up learning experiments with the mod­
ified action set in NDP show the deictic agents on aver­
age learn as fast the full-propositional agent in blocks1 
and slightly faster than the full-propositional agent in 
blocks2 [ 6]. 
However, it is important to note that, in general, nei­
ther the full-propositional nor the deictic agents with 
the modified action set learn an optimal policy here. 
The full-propositional agent does not because it must 
learn a policy for each way to name the blocks and 
this takes a long time; the deictic agents do not be­
cause an optimal policy for this action set still has a 
crucial dependence on past history. That is, the behav­
ior of the deictic agent's actions is dependent on the 
focus location; yet, the none of the marker locations 
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Figure 4: Learning curves for G algorithm in both domains. 
are observable by the agent-it must be recovered by 
examining past history. An unfortunate exploratory 
choice causes problems because the history that must 
be used to recover the focus location now includes the 
exploratory action. The reason the modified action set 
leads to better learning is because a plausible policy is 
available that does not rely on history at all. 5 
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Figure 5: The mean time-to-goal for different action sets 
plotted against the number of distractor blocks. 
The deictic state and action sets not only fail to exhibit 
the advantages we expected to find, but introduce new 
challenges to learning that must be overcome in order 
to make effective use of such representations. We con­
clude that it is possible to tailor the action set to the 
task so that a deictic representation is more feasible, 
but the flexibility of such an action set is obviously 
5Namely: look at the green block; pick up the block at 
the top of the stack (if the green block was clear, this leads 
to the goal); if my hand is full, look at the table; if I'm 
looking at the table, put the block down at the top of this 
stack. 
more limited. An action set that includes the abil­
ity for the agent to control its own attentional focus 
inherently increases the difficulty of the exploration 
problem because of the information about the domain 
stored implicitly in the location of the focus (and po­
tentially the markers). Thus, any exploratory actions 
that move the focus at random make it very hard for 
the agent to learn a useful policy. McCallum [9], in his 
blocks-world task with the more carefully-tuned action 
representation, also found that learning was much im­
proved when the exploration was guided by a human. 
The implications of the dependence of the optimal pol­
icy on history is examined in the next section. 
5.2 On NDP and G 
The common wisdom is that function approximators 
like neural nets are appropriate for problems in which 
all of the input attributes are relevant to some small 
degree, and that decision trees are appropriate when 
the function is well represented in terms of an unknown 
subset of the input features. In the full-propositional 
representation, any of the bits could be important, so 
it seems reasonable that NDP worked well. In the de­
ictic representation, we included many historical ob­
servations into the input vector, not knowing which 
ones might be relevant to the problem. In this sit­
uation, we might expect the tree-growing algorithms 
to be better: they should build a representation that 
reveals only enough of the hidden state to do the job. 
Our poor results with the G algorithm seem to be pri­
marily caused by the trees growing much larger than 
expected; they grew without reaching a natural limit­
ing state. To avoid running out of memory, we had to 
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add an arbitrary cap on the size of the trees. 
While the deictic agents initially learn faster with G 
than with NDP, they stopped making progress upon 
reaching the tree-size cap, and therefore never com­
pletely learn the task. Similarly, the full-propositional 
agent made no progress at all before the tree reached 
its maximum size. In the process of determining the 
cause behind the trees' seemingly unnecessarily large 
size, we discovered the true root of the problem that 
was preventing our deictic agents from learning effec­
tively. 
5.2.1 Unlimited Tree Growth 
Given the ability to characterize the current state in 
terms of past actions and observations, the learning al­
gorithm frequently comes up with multiple perceptual 
characterizations that correspond to the same under­
lying world state. For instance, the set of states de­
scribed by the focus was on a green block and then I 
looked up is the same as those described by the fo­
cus was on a green block and then I looked down, then 
up, then up, etc. In isolation, these redundant leaves 
do not seem to pose much of a problem-one solution 
would be an algorithm that grows a graph rather than 
a tree, allowing for information states that represent 
the same underlying state to be merged. However, in 
a tree, the impact of these redundant nodes can be 
severe. 
Once the tree contains multiple leaves for the same 
state based on historical distinctions, the agent may 
now learn to have a different policy in this state, de­
pending on its previous actions. This complicated pol­
icy now requires still more splits to fully learn the 
value function. There is, fundamentally, a kind of 
"arms race," in which a complex tree is required to 
adequately explain the Q values of the current pol­
icy. But the new complex tree allows an even more 
complex policy to be represented, creating a vicious 
cycle. The basic problem is that the tree is trying 
to grow enough leaves to learn the value function for 
every policy followed during the learning process. 
5.2.2 Incurable Partial Observability 
In investigating the problem of the very large trees, we 
attempted to build a tree by hand that would allow the 
agent to learn the optimal policy while containing as 
few leaves as possible. What we discovered instead 
was that it is not possible for any amount of history 
to make the domain Markov. This is because not all 
history sequences allow the agent to disambiguate oth­
erwise identical-looking states. Consider the example 
given at the beginning of Section 2, where the agent is 
looking at the red block. Clearly the two history se-
quences described in that section allow the agent to 
determine whether it has already cleared the green 
block or not. However, if the agent was looking at 
the table, performed a focus_color (red), and is now 
looking at the red block, we have no idea which of 
these two possible states we are in. Thus, the tree will 
always contain leaves that are ambiguous with respect 
to the true underlying state, and no amount of further 
splitting will remedy this. 
Thus, no matter how large the trees get, the agent is 
still trying to learn in a partially observable domain. 
In fact, this problem is present regardless of which 
learning algorithm is used; the problem is simply not 
Markovian, no matter how much history is added to 
the agent's observation. 
6 Conclusion 
In the end, none of the approaches for converting an 
inherently relational problem into a propositional one 
seems like it can be successful in the long run. The 
naive propositionalization grows exponentially in the 
number of objects in the environment; even worse, it is 
severely redundant due to the arbitrariness of assign­
ment of names to objects. The deictic approach has a 
seemingly fatal flaw: the inherent dramatic partial ob­
servability poses problems for model-free value-based 
reinforcement learning algorithms. The fundamental 
problem with using short-term history in a POMDP 
is this: the ability to disambiguate underlying states is 
necessary for learning a good policy, but past actions 
and observations are not useful data until a good pol­
icy is available. 
One possible direction to consider before abandoning 
this approach altogether would be to adopt Perkins' 
provably convergent algorithm for Monte Carlo learn­
ing in a partially observable domain [13]. While this 
algorithm is known to converge, it is not yet known 
whether it will converge to a desirable answer in this 
case. 
Alternatively, one could change the approach more 
fundamentally. There are three strategies to consider, 
two of which work with the deictic propositional repre­
sentation but forgo direct, value-based reinforcement 
learning. 
One alternative to value-based learning is direct pol­
icy search [17, 7], which is less affected by problems of 
partial observability but inherits all the problems that 
come with local search. It has been applied to learn­
ing policies that are expressed as stochastic finite-state 
controllers [11], which might work well in the blocks­
world domain. These methods are appropriate when 
the parametric form of the policy is reasonably well-
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known a priori, but probably do not scale to very large, 
open-ended environments. 
Another strategy is to apply the POMDP framework 
more directly and learn a model of the world dynam­
ics that includes the evolution of the hidden state. 
Then, we might use reinforcement-learning algorithms 
to more successfully learn to map this mental state to 
actions. 
A more drastic approach is to give up on proposi­
tional representations (though we might well want to 
use deictic expressions for naming individual objects), 
and use real relational representations for learning in 
blocks world. Some important early work has been 
done in relational reinforcement learning [5], showing 
that relational representations can be used to get ap­
propriate generalization in complex completely observ­
able environments. 
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